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FEDERAL EQUITABLE RELIEF IN 1ATTERS COLLATERAL
TO STATE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1971 the Supreme Court decided six cases involving requests for federal

equitable intervention in pending state criminal trials.' These cases, known as
the "Younger Sextet,"'2 opened a Pandora's box of legal problems for lower
federal courts. In the principle case, Younger v. Harris,3 the Court found that
based on "public policy, '

4

a federal district court should not enjoin a pending

state criminal prosecution, despite the unconstitutionality of the state statute
being enforced, except under very special circumstances. 5 The Court's "public
policy" considerations rested on two grounds. First, the Court noted that:
[under] the basic doctrine of equity jurisprudence... courts of equity should not act,
and particularly should not act to restrain a criminal prosecution, when the moving
party has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied
6
equitable relief.

Secondly, the Court concluded that, in the exercise of comity, federal courts
' 7
should have the "proper respect for state functions.
8
In Samuels v. Mackell, the Court brought the Younger rationale to bear in
a suit for an injunction against a state criminal proceeding to enforce a New
York criminal anarchy statute, or in the alternative, for a declaratory judgment that the statute was unconstitutional. 9 Mr. Justice Black, writing for the
majority, noted that the appellants were indicted by the New York courts and
therefore Younger itself was sufficient authority to deny the prayer for an
injunction.' 0 As to the declaratory judgment, the Court concluded that it
1. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Samuels v. MackelU, 401 U.S. 66 (1971); Boyle v.
Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200
(1971); Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971).
2. See Bowles v. Blue Lake Dev. Corp., 504 F.2d 1094, 1095 (5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam);
Duke v. Texas, 477 F.2d 244, 254 (5th Cir. 1973) (Goldberg J., concurring), cert. denied, 41S
U.S. 978 (1974); Gibert, Questions Unanswered by the February Sextet, 1972 Utah L. Rev. 14;
Spears, The Supreme Court February Sextet: Younger v. Harris Revisited, 26 Baylor L. Rev. 1
(1974); Note, Federal Declaratory Relief and the Non-Pending State Criminal Suit, 34 Md. L.
Rev. 87, 125 (1974).
3. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
4. Id. at 43.
5. Id. at 49.
6. Id. at 43-44. Citing the landmark case on the subject, Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240
(1926), Mr. Justice Black concluded that irreparable injury by itself was not enough unless it was
"'both great and immediate.'" 401 U.S. at 46.
7. 401 U.S. at 44. The Court referred to this notion of "comity" as essential to what it termed
"Our Federalism." Id. Basic to this consideration is the recognition that "state courts share with
federal courts an equivalent responsibility for the enforcement of federal rights, a responsibility
one must expect they will fulfill." Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 755-56 (1975).
8. 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
9. Id. at 68.
10. Id. at 68-69.
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would "result in precisely the same interference with and disruption of state
proceedings that the long-standing policy limiting injunctions was designed to
avoid."II
The facts and the remedy sought in all the cases comprising the "Younger
Sextet" were similar. 12 This uniformity did not allow the Court to fully
delineate the scope of the principles set forth in its decisions. As a result, clear
guidelines and exceptions
were not provided, ' 3 and several complex questions
14
were left unanswered.
One such question was whether a federal court may grant equitable relief
directed, not at a pending state criminal proceeding as in the Younger Sextet,
but at matters collateral, ancillary or incident to the criminal proceeding.
Although cases of this nature are rare, varying interpretations of Younger's
application to such proceedings have emerged in the United States Courts of
Appeals. Some circuits have strictly interpreted Younger as barring only
injunctions that would halt the state criminal prosecution. These circuits, in
11. Id.at 72.
12. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (injunction sought against enforcement of
California Criminal Syndicalism Act); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971) (injunction and
declaratory judgment sought against New York criminal anarchy statute); Boyle v, Landry, 401
U.S. 77 (1971) (injunction sought against enforcement of Illinois statute prohibiting "intimidation'); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971) (injunction sought against enforcement of Louisiana
obscenity statute and order suppressing seized evidence); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971)
(injunctions sought against enforcement of state obscenity statutes); Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S.
216 (1971) (injunctions sought against enforcement of state obscenity statutes).
13. The Court found that the requirement of irreparable injury could only be satisfied by two
situations. First there may be allegations of bad faith and harassment on the part of the state
prosecuting officials, as typified by Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965) (state prosecutions
brought with no expectation of valid convictions against a civil rights organization-an extreme
case). At the other end of the spectrum the Court noted that "the cost, anxiety, and inconvenience
of having to defend against a single criminal prosecution . . . ." brought in good faith, would not
justify federal intervention. 401 U.S. at 46. The applicability of Younger to less extreme cases
was not dealt with by the Court. Second, the Court noted that there may be "extraordinary
circumstances in which the necessary irreparable injury can be shown even in the absence of tle
usual prerequisites of bad faith and harassment." Id. at 53. As its only example of an
extraordinary circumstance the Court lists a statute " 'flagrantly and patently violative of express
constitutional prohibitions ....
' " Id., quoting Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 402 (1941).
14. Among these questions were Younger's applicability to quasi-criminal state proceedings,
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975) (Younger applicable to state civil property seizures
in connection with nuisance statute); Anonymous v. Association of the Bar, 515 F.2d 427 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3204 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1975) (No. 75-10) (Younger applicable to bar
grievance committee proceeding, a "quasi-judicial body" performing the same function that the
state court handled in the past), or to state civil proceedings, Polk v. State Bar, 480 F.2d 998 (5th
Cir. 1973) (Younger not applicable where state bar disciplinary action will not lead to disbarment
and hence not connected to enforcement of criminal laws); see Comment, The Extension of
Younger v. Harris to Non-Criminal Cases, 8 Creighton L. Rev. 454 (1974). Also in question was
Younger's effect where the state criminal proceeding was merely threatened. In Steffel v.
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974), the Court decided that "[wihen no state [criminal] proceeding Is
pending. . . considerations of equity, comity and federalism have little vitality ... Id. at 462.
The decision was followed in Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426 (1975).
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particular the Third and Fifth, have not construed Younger to bar the federal
district court from granting the equitable relief that is not directed at the
criminal proceeding. Other circuits, relying on the doctrine of comity, have
read "criminal proceedings" as "criminal processes" and have blanketly
refused to grant equitable relief where the subject is in any way related to a
state's enforcement of its criminal laws.
In O'Shea v. Littleton, 15 the Supreme Court, in dicta, indicated that it
favored a broad application of the Younger doctrine to encompass the
collateral matters of setting bond, sentencing and payment of jury fees. A year
later, however, in Gerstein v. Pugh, 16 the question of Younger's applicability
to a matter ancillary to a state criminal proceeding was again at issue. In
reviewing the validity of a federal injunction requiring a probable cause
hearing in state criminal actions, the Court indicated
its approval of a more
17
limited application of Younger in this area.
More recent Supreme Court decisions, however, have reaffirmed Younger's
vitality and expanded its application to other areas. In Huffinan v. Pursue,
Ltd., Is for example, the Court applied Younger to a civil property seizure in
connection with a state obscenity statute. The Court deferred to the state's
important interest in enforcing the obscenity statute, refusing to restrict
Younger to purely criminal cases. 19 In Schlesingerv. Councilman,20 the Court
applied the Younger doctrine to a suit by a serviceman to enjoin his court
martial proceedings. Although the "demands of federalism" were not present
because no state proceeding was involved, the Court found that the Army was
in effect a separate society, much like a state, and the doctrine of comity
should apply. 21 In Hicks v. Miranda, 22 the Court held that Younger comity
principles applied where the plaintiff filed suit in federal court challenging a
state obscenity statute, and was subsequently prosecuted under that statute in
state court.2 3 However, the Court has not squarely faced the issue of whether
Younger applies to grants of federal equitable relief in a matter collateral,
ancillary or incident to a state criminal proceeding. This Note will analyze
this issue in view of the different circuit court interpretations, as well as the
conflicting Supreme Court considerations.
15.

414 U.S. 488 (1974).

16.

420 U.S. 103 (1975).

17.

Id. at 108 n.9.

18.

420 U.S. 592 (1975).

19.
20.
21.

Id. at 599.
420 U.S. 738 (1975).
Id. at 746.

22.

95 S. Ct. 2281 (1975).

23. Id. at 2292. Among other decisions dealing with Younger in the same term were Doran
v. Salem Inn, Inc., 95 S. Ct. 2561 (1975) ($500 per day fine constitutes sufficient irreparable harm
to warrant preliminary injunction unless criminal proceedings were subsequently instituted); Ellis
v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426 (1975) (Younger not applicable w.here state prosecution was merely
threatened); Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117 (1975) (testimony allegedly coerced by New Jersey
Superior Court judges forming basis of prosecution ultimately appealable to same court held not
irreparable harm); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) (Court willing to hear argument on
applicability of Younger to dismissal of divorce petition).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

II. BEFORE O'Shea
The Third Circuit in Lewis v. Kugler 24 decided the first case after Younger
to deal with the issue of whether federal courts could grant injunctive relief in
matters collateral to state criminal proceedings. The court reversed a district
court dismissal of a prayer for injunctive and declaratory relief directed at the
New Jersey State Police. The plaintiffs had brought a civil rights class action
under the Civil Rights Act 25 against the New Jersey Attorney General alleging
that state troopers had engaged in a pattern of " 'arbitrary stops and unreasonable searches of their persons and their vehicles,' ",26 merely because
plaintiffs were bearded or long haired. Ten of the named plaintiffs were
subject to a New Jersey criminal action stemming from these stops and
searches, but seventeen were not. As to the ten, the court upheld the dismissal
since their situation was controlled by Younger. 27 However, with regard to
the seventeen not involved in any criminal proceeding, the court remanded to
the district court to consider the facts supporting the allegations and, if
necessary, to fashion appropriate relief. 28 The district court had been concerned
that the requested relief would inhibit state law enforcement and dismissed on
the grounds that "the principle of comity and the role of federalism" '29 required
the plaintiffs' claim to be presented to New Jersey courts. 30 In reversing, the
court of appeals reasoned that Younger had not altered the principle that federal
courts should hear cases involving injury to federal constitutional rights. The
court found the Younger principle inapplicable "because the bulk of the instant
31
complaint does not seek to interfere with pending state criminal proceedings. "
While recognizing the district court's concern over inhibiting state law enforcement as proper, the court concluded that the broad equitable powers at the
district court's disposal were adequate to avoid "endless time-consuming
bickering and controversy. '3 2 This decision indicated the court of appeals'
determination to construe Younger narrowly and to exercise its equitable powers
where the matter did not halt or interfere with a state criminal proceeding.33
24. 446 F.2d 1343 (3d Cir. 1971).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). The pertinent provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 provides
"Every person who, under color of any statute . . . of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be

subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." Id. This statute has been the
primary vehicle utilized by plaintiffs to gain entry into federal district court in the cases analyzed
in this Note. This is undoubtedly attributable to the broadness of its language, and jurisdictional
grant, 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970), which does not require a jurisdictional amount.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

446 F.2d at 1344.
Id. at 1348.
Id. at 1349-50.
324 F. Supp. 1220, 1222 (D.N.J.), rev'd & remanded, 446 F.2d 1343 (3d. Cir. 1971).
324 F. Supp. at 1224.
446 F.2d at 1347 n.6.
Id. at 1351.
In Goode v. Rizzo, 506 F.2d 542 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 420 U.S. 1003 (1975), the

court held that Younger and O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974), would not necessarily bar
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Lewis was subsequently reaffirmed and clarified by the Third Circuit in Conover v. Montemuro.34 In this civil rights class action, plaintiffs
sought equitable relief against the Pennsylvania juvenile intake procedures.
Plaintiffs alleged that the procedures violated the equal protection clause
because juveniles were denied a probable cause hearing that was afforded
adults. 35 It was also alleged that juveniles were denied due process of law
because the decision to file36 a petition of juvenile delinquency was based on a
"standardless procedure.1 The district court dismissed, reasoning that: "The
procedure challenged affects persons only when they are brought into the
juvenile court process. When this process has begun, the Younger and
37
Samuels cases say, the federal courts must not interfere."
The court of appeals found this reasoning inconsistent with Lewis v.
Kugler 38 and a misapplication of Younger. 39 The court stated that Lewis stood
for the proposition that "[e]ven if a state prosecution is pending, injunctive or
declaratory relief against state officers with respect to violations of federal
constitutional rights not . . . halt[ing] or substantially interfering] with a
pending prosecution may still be available." 40 The court stressed its narrow
interpretation of Younger and Samuels, stating that "Since a remedy with
respect to the intake procedures would not necessarily interfere with the
adjudication functions of the Commonwealth's juvenile court, it is therefore
not necessarily precluded .... ,,41
Implicit in the court's analysis was the
further consideration that a broad interpretation of Younger was at odds with
the spirit of section 1983.42
The Fifth Circuit has interpreted Younger in a similar fashion. 43 In Morgan
an injunction against unconstitutional police activity in Philadelphia. The court distinguished
Younger on the grounds that the injunction would not be directed at criminal prosecutions but at
police practices. 506 F.2d at 546.
34.

477 F.2d 1073 (3d Cir. 1973).
35. Id. at 1077.
36. Id. at 1076.
37. 328 F. Supp. 994, 995 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
38. 477 F.2d at 1079.
39. Id. at 1078.

40. Id. at 1080.
41. Id. at 1082. In his concurring opinion, Judge Adams distinguished Younger by noting
that, in the instant case, there was no constitutional attack on a state statute which might have
effectively brought the criminal prosecution to a halt, and that there was no prayer for
"injunctive or declaratory relief against a pending delinquency adjudication." Id. at 1090-91.
Instead, the action was characterized as merely seeking a "federal court judgment that holding
juveniles without a preliminary hearing . . . is unconstitutional." Id. at 1091.
42.

Id. at 1079. In Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S 241 (1967), the Court stated that "Congress

imposed the duty upon all levels of the federal judiciary to give due respect to a suitor's choice of
a federal forum for the hearing and decision of his federal constitutional claims. . . 'even though]
the rights asserted may be adjudicated in some other forum.' "Id. at 248; see Lewis v. Kugler, 446
F.2d 1343, 1347 (3d Cir. 1971).

43. This strict interpretation of Younger is significant in a circuit which has taken the lead in
expanding it in other areas. In Palaio v. McAuliffe, 466 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir. 1972), the court
disregarded any "criminal" or "civil" restrictions on Younger and based its conclusion on whether
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v. Wofford, 44 the court decided that Younger considerations would not bar an
injunction requiring a hearing to ascertain the amount of restitution a
convicted felon must pay the victim of his crime, where such payment was a
precondition to probation. 45 The court noted that it had "never intimated that
abstention is appropriate where there is no state court prosecution to be
interfered with .... *46 The court did not view this matter as a part of the
state court prosecution, finding the suit aimed at a "summary extra-judicial
process."47

The next year, in Pugh v. Rainwater,4 a civil rights class action, the Fifth
Circuit was again faced with a matter collateral to a state criminal action.
Plaintiffs alleged that the Florida criminal justice system deprived those
arrested of their constitutional right to a judicial hearing on the issue of
probable cause before detention. Under the Florida scheme, a person arrested
pursuant to a prosecutor's information was not given such hearing. 49 The
district court found that Younger precluded only the enjoining of the prosecution itself,50 concluding that an injunction requiring a probable cause
hearing was "not in conflict" with Younger because plaintiffs "ask the Court
neither to declare unconstitutional a state statute nor to enjoin a prosecution,
but instead pray for a declaration of procedural rights and an injunction from
the continued denial thereof."5'
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit upheld the injunction and found the claim "not
barred by considerations of federal-state comity" since plaintiffs "sought no
relief which would impede pending or future prosecutions ....
,,52 Echoing
the Supreme Court in Fuentes v. Shevin,53 the court stated: "[W]e have not
declined to adjudicate federal questions properly presented merely because
resolution of these questions would affect state procedures for handling
criminal cases .

. .

. [T]he relief sought is not 'against any pending or future

the "civil proceeding ... is an integral part of a state's enforcement of its criminal laws." Id. at
1233; see text accompanying note 19 supra.
44. 472 F.2d 822 (5th Cir. 1973).
45. Id. at 826. In this case Morgan's failure to pay $7,000 in restitution meant he would have
to serve a five year sentence for his "receiving stolen goods" conviction. Id. at 824.
46. Id. at 826. The court's use of the word "abstention" here should be taken as a generic
term for federal equitable restraint. It was not intended to mean abstention by a federal court to
obtain a clearer interpretation of state law by a state court in order to avoid a constitutional
question. See Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
47. 472 F.2d at 827. A broad interpretation of Younger might find the plaintiff too enmeshed
in the state criminal process for a federal court to intervene.
48. 483 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1973), aff'd in part & rev'd in part sub nom. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420
U.S. 103 (1975).
49. Id. at 780.
50. 332 F. Supp. 1107, 1111 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
51. Id.; see note 41 supra. The court subsequently adopted a plan submitted by the Dade
County Sheriff which required that persons arrested with or without a warrant be given a
prompt preliminary hearing before a magistrate. 336 F. Supp. 490 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
52. 483 F.2d at 781.
53 407 U.S. 67, 71 n.3 (1972).
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court proceedings as such.' ,,54 The court characterized plaintiffs' suit as a
challenge to "an aspect of the criminal justice system which adversely affects
him but which cannot be vindicated in the state court trial" and hence
"comity is no bar to his challenge." s5 The court found Younger not applicable
even though an aspect of the state criminal justice system was involved. In
those few cases where it has faced the problem, the Fifth Circuit has not
hesitated to issue injunctive relief concerning a state criminal trial where the
56
injunction would not halt or interfere with the integrity of the trial.
Other circuits also have declined to extend the rule of Younger to this area.
In Greenmount Sales, Inc. v. Davila5 7 for example, the district court ordered
the city of Richmond to return all allegedly obscene material seized from
plaintiff bookstore, and required the bookstore to provide copies at the state
trial. 5 8 The court reasoned that it had not violated the principles of comity
because it did not enjoin the state trial itself.5 9 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit
reversed and issued its own judgment which in effect was "not dissimilar" to
the district court order, the city was allowed to keep one copy of each
document for prosecution purposes. 60 The circuit court also found that comity
was not violated since the district judge had not enjoined the state proceeding
61
itself and therefore "effectively followed the teaching of Younger."1
54. 483 F.2d at 781 (emphasis added by court).
55. Id.at 782.
56. In Peterson v. Talisman Sugar Corp., 478 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1973), the Fifth Circuit
granted an injunction permitting religious workers and leaders to enter a company-owned
migrant labor camp despite the fact that they were being prosecuted in state court for criminal
trespass for repeatedly trying to enter the camp. The district court dismissed the action, finding
that Younger barred any equitable relief where a criminal action was underway. Id. at 87. While
the court of appeals conceded that an injunction against the sheriff prohibiting his enforcement of
the criminal trespass statute was barred by Younger, it found that an injunction directed at the
sugar company was not proscribed. Id. at 78. The court reasoned that "the state court
prosecution could have no bearing upon whether or not [defendant's] guards continued to deny
admission to the plaintiffs." Id. at 79.
In Jones v. Wade, 479 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1973), suit was brought challenging a Texas law
prohibiting desecration of the American flag by a youth who had been arrested twice for having
flag patches on his jeans. Both times he was released; the second time the state suspended
prosecution pending the outcome of the federal suit. Concluding that Younger considerations
should not deprive the district court of jurisdiction, the court of appeals stated: "A federal
injunction at the pre-prosecution stage causes only minimal disruption of the state's enforcement
of its criminal laws, since state prosecutorial machinery has not yet been set in motion." Id. at
1181. This reasoning can be analogized to a matter collateral to a pending criminal trial and the
desire to afford federal relief with only "minimal disruption" of state criminal proceedings.
57. 479 F.2d 591 (4th Cir. 1973).
58. 344 F. Supp. 860, 866 (E.D. Va. 1972).
59. Id.
60. 479 F.2d at 592.
61. 'Id. at 593. The court pointed out that Younger "was decided in the context of an
injunction issued by the district court preventing a prosecution then pending in the . . .state
criminal system." Id. at 592; cf. Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971) (request to suppress
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In another case, Jones v. Superintendent, Virginia State Farm, 62 the
plaintiff brought a section 1983 action seeking to obtain free transcripts of an
unsuccessful state habeas corpus petition. The court found that an indigent
defendant must be furnished with a free transcript of his state criminal trials
"when a need for a transcript in order to collaterally attack a conviction is
shown .. "63 Although the plaintiff at bar failed to show sufficient need for the
transcript, the court reasoned that injunctions of this type would "not amount to
unwarranted interference" 64 with a pending state criminal action since it would
65
be aimed at correcting an unconstitutional situation.
The Seventh Circuit also indicated that it took a strict view of Younger's
scope. In Littleton v. Berbling,66 black citizens of Cairo, Illinois brought a
civil rights class action seeking an injunction against a county magistrate and
a county circuit court judge for their alleged unconstitutional practices in
setting bond, sentencing, and payment of jury fees. 67 Plaintiffs alleged, inter
alia, that defendants purposely enforced state criminal laws more harshly
against blacks by setting bond in criminal cases according to "an unofficial
bond schedule without regard to the facts of a case .... "68
The court of appeals, in reversing the district court's dismissal, 69 found that
the complaint alleged sufficient violations of federally protected rights to
properly invoke federal jurisdiction. 70 The court found that "Younger does
not control this sort of case .... ",7'primarily because "plaintiffs ha[d] not
admission of allegedly obscene material denied because such order would have effectively halted
the state criminal proceeding).
62. 460 F.2d 150 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S, 944 (1973).
63. Id.at 152.
64. The district court's fears of unwarranted interference with state prosecutions, in contravention of Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971), note 12 supra, and Stefanelli v. Minard, 342
U.S. 117 (1951), note 92 infra, were not persuasive to the court of appeals. 460 F.2d at 152 n.3.
65. 460 F.2d at 152 n.3; see note 41 and text accompanying note 51 supra. In Fowler v.
Alexander, 478 F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 1973), the Fourth Circuit had an opportunity to clarify its
position as to the propriety of federal equitable relief directed at a matter ancillary to a pending
state criminal proceeding. The plaintiff sought to challenge the constitutionality of a North
Carolina statute assessing costs for witnesses in a criminal proceeding initiated by his complaint.
When plaintiff refused to pay on grounds of indigency, he was jailed for one day before a relative
paid his witness costs. Since the complaint did not allege that the plaintiff intended to prosecute a
suit, the court ruled that he lacked standing to challenge the statute. Had the plaintiff paid the
tax and then brought a class action seeking a declaration of unconstitutionality, the Fourth
Circuit could have required the plaintiff to initiate a state court action, a procedure favored by
the Second Circuit. See notes 87-99 infra and accompanying text. Alternatively, the court could
have gone to the merits of the declaratory judgment, since the judgment would not be aimed at
terminating a state criminal proceeding. This procedure is favored by the Third and Fifth
Circuits. See notes 24-56 supra and accompanying text.
66. 468 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd sub nom. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974); see
notes 100-108 infra.
67. 468 F.2d at 393.
68. Id.
69. Id.at 415.
70. Id.at 395.
71. Id. at 408.
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sought to enjoin the state from prosecuting anyone, but merely to enjoin the
judges from unconstitutionally fixing bail and sentences. 72 The court, in
remanding, left the task of fashioning relief to the discretion of the district
court, but indicated that it might include "periodic reports of various types of
aggregate data on actions on bail and sentencing and dispositions of complaints.

73

The rationale holding Younger inapplicable to matters collateral to a state
criminal prosecution is based on two grounds: the injunction would not halt
the state prosecution, and the relief is directed at correcting an unconstitu74
tional situation.
Despite the development of the strict interpretation of Younger in the
Third, Fourth, Fifth and Seventh Circuits, the Second and Ninth Circuits
ha've taken a contrary approach. In Kinney v. Lenon,75 plaintiffs sought
equitable relief to declare unconstitutional an Oregon statute that did not
permit bail for juveniles. 76 The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that while
neither the injunction nor the declaratory judgment sought would have
terminated the pending juvenile proceeding, the interference would be
substantial enough to fall under the Younger rationale.7 7 The court found that
the juvenile court's jurisdiction began as soon as the child was taken into
custody and "[a]ny interference at this stage would clearly be at odds with the
principles of comity and federalism which underlie Younger. ' 71 8
Kinney was the controlling authority in the Ninth Circuit's later decision in
Rivera v. Freeman.7 9 In that decision the court dealt with an attack on the
constitutionality of a California statute that permitted detention of minors up
to seventy-two hours without a hearing and without a provision permitting minors to post money bail after the hearing.8 0 The lower court dismissed
the action.
The Circuit Court affirmed, finding that Younger barred the suit-8' The
72.

Id.; accord, Utz v. Cullinane, 520 F.2d 467, 472 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (dictum).

73.

468 F.2d at 415.

74. In Cox v. Turley, 506 F.2d 1347 (6th Cir. 1974), plaintiff alleged that the practice of
placing juveniles in the Madison County, Kentucky jail without a hearing before a judicial officer
constituted a violation of their constitutional rights. Id. at 1348. The Sixth Circuit reversed the
district court finding that the complaint failed to state a claim for federal relief. Id. at 1355. Judge
Miller, in his concurring opinion, noted the possible Younger problem assuming the allegations
proved to be factual. Echoing the standard argument of the circuits which take a strict view of
Younger, he stated that the injunction would be proper even though the state prosecution had yet
to be completed because "(a) ... the action is not intended as one to enjoin or disrupt the state
prosecution, and (b) . . . the relief sought is essentially to redress the alleged violations of the
constitutional rights of the plaintiff .
Id. at 1356.
75.
76.
77.

447 F.2d 596 (9th Cir. 1971).
Id. at 600.
Id. at 601.

78.

Id. Compare text accompanying note 37 supra with notes 40-41 supra and accompanying

text.
79.
80.
81.

469 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir. 1972).
Id. at 1161-62.
Id. at 1164-65.
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plaintiffs argued that since they did not seek to stay the court proceedings and
the suit was aimed at a " 'procedural incident related to such prosecutions,' 182
Younger should not apply. The court found this argument merely "interesting" and bowed to the authority
of Kinney and the "longstanding policies of
83
comity and federalism."
The Ninth Circuit has taken a pervasive view of Younger's applicability by
considering whether the injunction would interfere with the criminal process
rather than the criminal prosecution itself. This is a major distinction between
the broad view and the strict view of the Younger principle. In its most recent
decision on the subject, 84 however, the Ninth Circuit seemed to break with
the previous line of cases by issuing a declaratory judgment in favor of
indigent parents who sought court appointed counsel in child dependency
cases. The court found that an injunction requiring the state to provide
counsel was an unwarranted intervention in the state court process. Thus the
court overturned the district court injunction that had halted all cases where
an indigent parent was denied counsel. 8 5 However, the decision was complicated by a long history of state court refusals to hear the matter. Thus,
notwithstanding its interpretation of Younger, the court found that plaintiffs
had no other forum to litigate this issue and issued a declaratory judgment
that legal counsel should be provided at these hearings "whenever an indigent
parent, unable to present his or her case properly, faces a substantial
'8 6
possibility of the loss of custody or of prolonged separation from a child."
87
In Leslie v. Matzkin, decided soon after Younger, the Second Circuit
refused to order the production of free transcripts of probable cause hearings
for indigent defendants.88 The court noted that the transcripts were otherwise
easily obtainable and focused on the effect of the requested order. 89 Noting that
82. Id. at 1164. Compare this outcome with notes 35-37 & 74 supra and accompanying text.
83. 469 F.2d at 1165. In Henkel v. Bradshaw, 483 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1973), the court
refused to order a state court to appoint counsel to an indigent in a "show cause" proceeding to
determine why the indigent had not paid $150 in child support. Although this was technically a
civil proceeding, the court was "concerned with the possible penal outcome of the hearing."
Since the defendant could have been imprisoned up to six months, " 'the interests of the state
involved are at least of equal gravity' .. . as in the usual state criminal proceeding." Id. at 1389,
quoting Kinney v. Lenon, 447 F.2d 596, 601 (9th Cir. 1971). These factors made the proceeding
sufficiently criminal, see text accompanying note 19 supra, for the court to apply Younger to
avoid an order which "would be particularly intrusive to Oregon court procedure and 'would
clearly be at odds with the principles of comity and federalism which underlie Younger.' " 483
F.2d at 1389.
84. Cleaver v. Wilcox, 499 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1974). Although decided after O'Shea v.
Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974), the court did not cite that case, finding the circuit's previous
decisions and their broad view of Younger to be sufficient.
85. 499 F.2d at 943-44.
86. Id. at 945-46. The court did not order the state to provide counsel to the indigents since
the challenged statutes had been amended, thus entitling plaintiffs to counsel.
87. 450 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 932 (1972).
88. Id. at 312. The suit charged that the Connecticut statute deprived indigents of their
constitutional rights by failing to provide the transcripts to assist the defense at trial. Id. at 311.
89. Id. at 311. The court found that under the statute, a free transcript could be obtained by
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this case "calls for deference to the state's procedures," 90 the court concluded that
federal intervention was not warranted
due to an absence of "special cir92
cumstances" 9 1 set forth in Younger.
A few months later, in Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller,93 the court again relied upon Younger and the theory of comity94 to
dismiss a civil rights action seeking to enjoin in-prison interrogation of
inmates unless "conducted in the presence of the inmate's counsel." s The
court denied the injunction partly because the interrogations were connected
with a state grand jury investigation into the Attica prisoners' revolt. 96 The
court reasoned that the order, "in addition to its obvious potential for
exacerbating federal-state relations, might constitute an unwarranted intrusion upon the pending state criminal proceeding." 97 These decisions immediately indicated that the Second Circuit's view of the Younger doctrine
would be a broad one. The court found Younger to be more than simply a
restriction on federal equitable relief directed solely at halting a pending state
criminal trial.
the indigent by having his own attorney "appointed a special public defender, or by having a
regular public defender appointed solely for the purpose of procuring a free transcript." Id.
90. Id. at 312.
91. Id.; see note 13 supra and accompanying text.
92. 450 F.2d at 312. Prior to Younger, the Second Circuit had also refused to interfere with
matters collateral to state criminal proceedings, relying mainly on the authority of Stefanelli v.
Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951). In Stefanelli, the plaintiff sought an injunction to suppress the fruits
of an allegedly illegal search and seizure. The Court refused to grant the injunction based on a
desire "that the orderly course of judicial proceedings should not . . . be broken up for the
piecemeal determination of the issues involved." Id. at 123 n.5. In McLucas v. Palmer, 427 F.2d
239 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 937 (1970), the court refused to review a state judge's order
imposing vast security measures on the criminal trial of a Black Panther. Basing its decision on
Stefanelli, the court found federal interference with the state's administration of its criminal
justice system to be prohibited in order to uphold the "important rule of federalism." Id. at 241.
The court concluded that the relief sought would raise the possibilities of an "unseemly conflict"
between state and federal orders or of delays in the state criminal trial, which was "just what
Stefanelli meant to avoid." Id.at 242.
93. 453 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1971).
94. Id. at 22.
95. Id.at 21.
96. Id.at 22. The disturbance at Attica gave rise
to a number of cases inwhich the Second
Circuit applied Younger. In Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375
(2d Cir. 1973), the court affirmed the dismissal of a class action by inmates, seeking an injunction
to require federal and state officials
to investigate and prosecute "persons who allegedly have
violated certain federal and state criminal statutes." Id.at 376. The court dismissed the claims
against the state officials
and pointed out that the elaborate relief
sought was "inadvisable." Id.at
382. The court concluded that even the recent Seventh Circuit decision in Littleton v. Berbling,
468 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd sub nom. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974), was not
sufficient authority to warrant the broad relief
plaintiffs sought. 477 F.2d at 382-83.
97. 453 F.2d at 22. Note that the plaintiffs were not indicted by the grand jury but were
merely vitnesses. This typifies the Second Circuit's view of Younger. See text accompanying note
99 infra.
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Finally, in Wallace v. Kern, 98 (Wallace I), the Second Circuit reversed a
preliminary injunction that had ordered the Clerk of the Criminal Term of the
Kings County Supreme Court to place on the court calendar all pro se motions
filed by inmates of the Brooklyn House of Detention. The court stated that
"under the principle known as comity a federal district court has no power to
intervene in the internal procedures of the state courts." 99 In the Second
Circuit's opinion, Younger applied to the whole state criminal process
and not merely to state criminal proceedings. The circuit courts' differing
opinions as to the scope of Younger in matters collateral, ancillary or incident
to a pending state criminal proceeding remained without Supreme Court
direction until O'Shea v. Littleton.

III.

O'Shea v. Littleton

AND ITS EFFECT

In O'Shea v. Littleton, 100 plaintiffs sought an injunction against a county
magistrate and a county circuit court judge for their purported racially
discriminatory practices in setting bond, sentencing and payment of jury
fees. 10 1 The Seventh Circuit, in accord with those circuits strictly construing
Younger, found that the relief sought would not halt a pending criminal trial
and consequently was not barred by Younger.1 02 The Supreme Court reversed, however, holding that federal courts lacked jurisdiction to hear the
suit because the complaint did not allege that any of the named plaintiffs had
suffered any injury as a result of any specific unconstitutional act. 10 3 Plaintiffs
"failed to satisfy the threshold requirement imposed by Art. III of the
Constitution .... "104 Nonetheless, in dicta, the Court assumed that even if
the plaintiffs had standing, the injunction would be violative of Younger. 105
Mr. Justice White, writing the majority opinion, focused on the remedy
that the court of appeals had contemplated: periodic reports of the bond and
sentencing actions of the defendants. 10 6 The Court found that this was
"nothing less than an ongoing federal audit of state criminal proceedings
which would indirectly accomplish the kind of interference that Younger v.
98. 481 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1973) (per curiam), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1135 (1974).
99. Id. at 622. Wallace v. Kern, 499 F.2d 1345 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 947
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Wallace II] also stemmed from the conditions in the Brooklyn House

of Detention. The district court granted a preliminary injunction ordering that each detainee held
for more than six months be given a trial within forty-five days of request, or be released. The
court held that this was necessary to correct a continuing deprivation of detainee's sixth
amendment rights. The Second Circuit reversed, on the ground that deprivation of a speedy trial
should be decided on a case by case basis, not by a sweeping order. 499 F.2d at 1351.
100. 414 U.s. 488 (1974).
101. Id. at 492.
102. Littleton v. Berbling, 468 F.2d 389, 408 (7th Cir. 1972); see text accompanying notes
66-73 supra.
103. 414 U.S. at 494-96.
104. Id. at 493.
105. Id. at 499.
106. Id. at 500-02. The Seventh Circuit suggested that the injunctive relief granted might
include "periodic reports of various types of aggregate data on actions on bail and sentencing and
dispositions of complaints." 468 F.2d at 415.
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Harris . . . and related cases sought to prevent."' 0 7 The "interference"
consisted of constant interruptions of state proceedings in order to federally
adjudicate charges of non-compliance.10 8 This decision indicated a favorable
attitude on the part of the Court toward a broad reading of Younger, so as to
preclude federal courts from granting injunctive relief in matters collateral to
state criminal proceedings.
The Ninth Circuit continued to broadly apply the Younger rationale
deriving additional authority for this view from O'Shea. In Cadena v.
Perasso,10 9 the court upheld the dismissal of a civil rights class action brought
against a municipal judge, stemming from the manner in which he revoked
plaintiffs' probation. While before the judge as a result of a new felony
charge, plaintiffs' previous probation was revoked without allowing them
"assistance of counsel, written notice of the alleged probation violation, the
opportunity to be heard, and the opportunity to present witnesses on their
own behalf."" 0 The court of appeals, relying upon Younger, concluded that
there was "no need for a court of equity to interfere with state criminal
proceedings.""' In the final sentence of its opinion, the court cited O'Shea for
the proposition that federal courts should avoid " 'an ongoing federal audit of
state criminal proceedings

. .

. [that] would indirectly accomplish the kind of

interference that Younger v. Harris... sought to prevent.' " '1 It was not clear
what the court considered a "state criminal proceeding." Under a broad
interpretation of Younger, either the revocation of probation or the determination of bail is sufficient involvement in the state criminal process to
warrant denial of an injunction. 113
The effect of the Courts decision in O'Shea was even more pronounced in
the Fifth Circuit. In Gardner v. Luckey, '14 that circuit altered its prior view.
The plaintiffs in a civil rights class action alleged that the procedures of the
Florida Public Defender Offices deprived indigent defendants of due process
by failing to meet minimal constitutional standards." 5 Specifically, they
alleged that Public Defenders failed to consult with clients, to advise them of
their legal rights, or to provide adequate investigation of possible factual and
legal defenses. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the offices from continuing to
represent indigents until certain minimal standards were instituted.' 16 The
107.

414 U.S. at 500.

108. Id.
109.
110.

498 F.2d 383 (9th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 384.

111.

Id.

112.

Id., quoting O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 500 (1974); see text accompanying note

107 supra.
113. See text accompanying notes 37 & 78 supra.
114. 500 F.2d 712 (5th Cir. 1974).
115. Id.at 713.
116. Id.The plaintiffs asserted that excessive case loads caused them to be inadequately
defended. Id. In addition, their minimal standards included a request that an attorney from the
Defender's Office be required to consult with the accused indigent within forty-eight hours of
arrest and to prohibit him from withdrawing except with the court's permission. Id. at 713 n.2.
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court affirmed the district court's dismissal, noting that "[tihis case bears a
strong resemblance to O'Shea v. Littleton."" 7 Consequently, the court followed an identical line of reasoning by finding no "case or controversy," since
none of the named plaintiffs alleged that they were "injured by the conduct of
the Public Defenders." ' 1 8 The court then found that certain remedies sought
by plaintiffs were barred by Younger. 119 Even when considered in the light of
the Fifth Circuit's previous views, the result is not surprising. It is evident
that part of the relief sought, namely an injunction barring the Public
Defenders from continuing to represent indigents until the constitutional
standards could be implemented, would require a halt to the state proceedings. However, previous Fifth Circuit decisions with their narrow reading of
Younger do not seem to bar relief for other portions of the complaint.' 20 The
court's change of view is apparent from its finding that the "appellants
contemplate exactly the sort of intrusive and
unworkable supervision of state
12 1
judicial processes condemned in O'Shea.'

IV. Gerstein v. Pugh
In Gerstein v. Pugh, 122 the Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's
holding that hearings to determine probable cause before detention were
required by the Constitution. 123 The Court considered the Younger problem
in a footnote, approving the district court's reasoning that "claim for relief
was not barred by the equitable restrictions on federal intervention in state
prosecutions .... ,,124 The Court distinguished Younger, finding that:
The injunction was not directed at the state prosecutions as such, but only at the
legality of pretrial detention without a judicial12 5hearing, an issue that could not be
raised in defense of the criminal prosecution.

Since the apparent obfuscation of the law by Gerstein, the Second Circuit,
the only circuit that has been active in this area subsequent to that decision,
has continued to broadly construe Younger. In Bedrosian v. MintZ, 116
117. Id.at 714.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. For example, before the Supreme Court's decision in O'Shea, it is probable that the court
would not have found an injunction, requiring a specific Public Defender to handle the entire case
unless the court's permission is given for a withdrawal, to be an intrusion into a state criminal
proceeding. See, e.g., notes 44-56 supra and accompanying text.
121. Id. at 715 (emphasis added). The court relied upon Inmates of Attica Correctional
Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1973) for this proposition. See note 96 supra.
122. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
123. Id. at 126. The Court upheld the Fifth Circuit ruling that the fourth amendment
requires "timely judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to detention," but
disagreed that the Constitution mandated an adversary hearing.
124. Id. at 108 n.9.
125. Id. The Court continued its footnote discussion by citing Conover v. Montemuro, 477
F.2d 1073 (3d Cir. 1973), which strictly interpreted Younger. See notes 34-42 supra and
accompanying text. The Court apparently did not find O'Shea to be at odds with its reasoning
since the case was not mentioned in the opinion.
126. 518 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1975).
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plaintiffs, indictees in Attica criminal cases and their out-of-state attorneys,
alleged that the decision by New York State Supreme Court Justice Ball to
appoint only in-state attorneys to represent the Attica defendants was a denial
of equal protection.1 2 7 The district court dismissed the action on grounds that
matters within the discretion of a state trial judge must be reviewed directly
on appeal and not collaterally under the Civil Rights Act.1 2-8 The court could
have stood firmly on the district courfs finding, but instead relied upon the
Younger doctrine and O'Shea to bar injunctive relief, 129 that would "disrupt
. . . state criminal proceedings in sharp conflict with the principles" of
Younger.1 30 In response to plaintiff's argument that federal-state comity,
which underlies Younger, was not applicable "since the assignment of counsel
is merely a collateral matter in the prosecution,"' 3 1 the court pointed out that
if a federal court must refrain from staying state prosecutions outright, " 'how
much more reluctant must it be to intervene piecemeal to try collateral
issues.' "1132
Ten days later, in Wallace v. Kern133 (Wallace III), the Second Circuit
provided the most detailed analysis in any circuit to date of the O'SheaGerstein dichotomy involving the applicability of Younger to matters collateral to a state criminal proceeding. In that case plaintiffs alleged, inter alia,
that bail procedures denied plaintiffs their right to due process. The district
court had ordered broad changes in the New York bail system based on
extensive findings of fact that revealed that an arrested person might be
detained anywhere from forty-five days1 34 to fourteen months 35 in some cases
as a result of the denial of bail, or the fixing of bail that the detainee could not
meet. While setting bail is ordinarily within the judge's discretion, the district
court found that two documents regularly used by judges in bail
determinations-a New York State Criminal Investigation Information Report (NYSIIS) and a Release on Own Recognizance (ROR) sheet-were often
inaccurate and incomplete. 13 6 The district court found that due to time
limitations, in most instances it is not possible to verify facts favorable to a
127. Id. at 397-98. Justice Ball had reasoned that: "(1) the court was unfamiliar with the
competence of out-of-state counsel or their understanding of New York law; (2) there were
attorneys licensed to practice in New York who were ready and willing to accept assignments;
and (3) 'the expenses involved in transportation, living expenses, accommodations for office space
etc. [for out-of-state counsel] would be an excessive burden upon the taxpayers of New York
State depleting the state funds which were intended for the legal defense of the defendants.' "Id.
at 398. New York law leaves assignment of counsel and payment of fees to the trial judge's
discretion. N.Y. County Law §§ 722, 722-b (McKinney Supp. 1975).
128. 518 F.2d at 398.
129. Id. at 399.
130. Id. The Court also noted that appellants had failed to show great and immediate
irreparable injury, or that they had no adequate remedy at law, since there were several able
New York attorneys ready to take up the defense. Id.
131. Id. at 399 n.5.
132. Id., quoting Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 123 (1951); see note 92 supra.
133. 520 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1975).
134. No. 72 C 898 at 8 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 1975) (Judd, J.) (unreported).
135. Id. at 7.
136. Id. at 9-10. The court found the NYSIIS to be inaccurate 75% to 90% of the time. Id.
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37

defendant before the initial bail hearing. 1 As a result, unverified favorable
facts were often denied weight. In addition, reasons for bail decisions were
rarely entered in the record for later judicial review. 138 Judge Judd's order
sought to correct this situation by requiring, inter alia, an evidentiary hearing
on the bail decision on demand within seventy-two hours. 139
The court of appeals first considered whether the district court order
mandated "a wholesale reform of the New York State bail system which
constitutes an untoward interference with the state judicial system and
violates established principles of comity and federalism" in conflict with
Younger and O'Shea. 140 Relying upon its prior decisions in Wallace I and
11141 as barring orders which "constituted an improper intervention in the
internal procedures of state courts, ' 14 2 the court characterized the order at bar
as "federal judicial legislation" 143 that was offensive to the state.
The court further noted that in Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 144 the Supreme
Court had recently expanded Younger to include a civil property seizure by
the state that had heavy overtones of a criminal proceeding. The court
emphasized language in the Supreme Court's opinion seemingly broadening
the reach of Younger beyond pending state criminal proceedings to the " 'state
criminal law enforcement process.' "145 In addition, the court pointed out that
other recent Supreme Court decisions
had reaffirmed the policy considerations
146
underlying nonintervention.
Appellants, however, contended that Younger was not applicable since
plaintiffs "were not seeking interference with a criminal trial or any pending
bail application,"1 47 but were simply seeking a declaration of rights. The
court found the mandatory nature of the order, supplanting existing procedures, to be "an interference with the state criminal process in both pending
and future bail proceedings.' 148 The court concluded that, based on its earlier
decision in Bedrosian v. Mintz 149 and the recent Supreme Court decision in
137. Id. at 10.
138. Id. at 15.
139. Id. at 65-66. The order provided in substance that: (1) an evidentiary hearing be had on
demand any time after seventy-two hours from the original arraignment, (2) the state have the
burden at the preliminary hearing of proving what form of security, if any, would be necessary to
secure the defendant's appearance in court and of providing a statement of the reasons why
non-monetary conditions of release will not assure defendant's presence at trial, and (3) detainee
be provided with a written statement of the reasons for fixing or denying bail. Id. at 65-66.
140. 520 F.2d at 404.
141. See notes 98-99 supra and accompanying text.
142. 520 F.2d at 404. Note that the court used "procedures" and not "proceedings,"
indicating a broad view of Younger's applicability to the state criminal system. The court had
ruled previously that it had "no power" to intervene. Wallace v. Kern, 481 F.2d 621, 622 (2d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1135 (1974); see text accompanying note 99 supra.
143. 520 F.2d at 408.
144. 420 U.S. 592 (1975); see notes 18 & 19 supra and accompanying text.
145. 520 F.2d at 404; see 420 U.S. at 599.
146. 520 F.2d at 404; see notes 18-23 supra and accompanying text.
147. 520 F.2d at 405 n.9.
148. Id.
149. 518 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1975); see notes 126-32 supra and accompanying text. Bedrosian
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Hicks v. Miranda,150 the proposition that Younger was applicable only where
the federal injunction
was directed at a pending state criminal prosecution
15 1
was unsupportable.

Appellants argued further that O'Shea was inapplicable in the light of the
Supreme Court's decision in Gerstein.' S2 However, the court found that
Gerstein was distinguishable both on the law and on the facts from Wallace
III. 153 Rather, the court found that O'Shea was controlling since the injunction in Wallace III would have interfered with
state criminal processes to the
4
same extent as the injunction in O'Shea. Is
The court emphasized the Court's statement in O'Shea that federal district
courts should refrain from issuing orders amounting to an "ongoing federal
audit of state criminal proceedings which would indirectly accomplish the
kind of interference that Younger v. Harris . . . and related cases sought to

prevent."' 5 s The order of the district court, particularly in determining the
nature of the hearing and fixing of burden of proof,' 5 6 was deemed such an
interference since it permitted a pretrial detainee to claim noncompliance with
the order and to proceed to a federal court for an interpretation thereof.
In Gerstein, the order was simple and self-executing. 157 On the other hand,
much had to occur before the order in O'Shea became operative: a member of
the vaguely defined class' 5 8 must be arrested and indicted; and at the setting
of the bond, there must be discrimination by the judge against the class
member. There are many steps in this procedure that require a federal court
to distinguish between discretion and discrimination on th6 part of the state
court judge.' 59 The order in Wallace III was not beset with these problems.
The plaintiff class was clearly defined-detainees charged with felonies. The
actions needed to comply with the order were clear.160 It seems, therefore,
specifically rejected the contention that Younger was only applicable where the federal court
sought to enjoin a pending state criminal prosecution. 518 F.2d at 399 n.5; see notes 41, 54 & 67
supra and accompanying text.
150. 95 S. Ct. 2281 (1975); see text accompanying notes 22-23 supra.
151. 520 F.2d at 405.
152. Id. at 406; see text accompanying notes 122-25 supra.
153. 520 F.2d at 406-08.
154. Id. at 408. The court found it difficult to "agree that the Gerstein Court intended to
overrule O'Shea in a footnote which does not even discuss it." Id.
155. 414 U.S. at 500; see text accompanying notes 107 & 112 supra.
156. See note 139 supra.
157. 420 U.S. at 108.
158. The class was defined as those who," 'on account of their race or creed and because of
their exercise of First Amendment rights, have [been] in the past and continue to be subjected to
the unconstitutional and selectively discriminatory enforcement and administration of criminal
justice in Alexander County ....
' " 414 U.S. at 491.
159. The Supreme Court was aware of this problem: "[Tlhe question arises of how compliance might be enforced if the beneficiaries of the injunction were to charge that it had been
disobeyed." Id. at 501.
160. The district court order provided dearly defined time limits for holding of the preliminary hearing. See note 139 supra. Also, requiring a written statement of reasons for bail should
not pose a great hardship or intrusion on state judges since they had previously been requested to
do this by the Administrative Judge, and were doing it verbally. No. 72 C 898 at 14-15
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that the injunction in Wallace III was more similar to the one in Gerstein
than in O'Shea.
When faced with the argument that the intrusion sought in Wallace III was
not as significant as that in O'Shea and closer to that of Gerstein, the Second
Circuit did not examine the difference in facts among the three cases and the
effect of the relief sought in each. Instead, the court considered the injunction
sought by plaintiffs to be a more pervasive intrusion than that in Gerstein
because it "did not invite state officials to submit a plan for a bail hearing
which would be consistent with due process requirements."' 6 1 It found this to
be inconsistent with the admonition in Gerstein that the states be allowed
163
162
in setting up pretrial procedures.
"flexibility and experimentation"'
Consequently, the court concluded that Gerstein "does not provide assistance
here but, on the contrary, strengthens the stand of the
to the plaintiffs
64
defendants."'

The court overlooked the traditional reasoning in due process cases, 165 as
well as the language in Gerstein that the federal courts should provide
minimal standards and guidelines within which a state may operate nearly
unfettered in its discretion.' 66 In cases involving matters collateral to state
criminal proceedings there can be significant differences in the remedies
sought and the extent of their intrusion. Determining and ordering a
minimum standard of legal representation, as requested in Gardner,167 or
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 1975) (Judd, J.) (unreported). The nature of the hearing was not intended to
be a full scale adversary hearing, but had the purpose of considering all facts which might update
and verify the NYSIIS and ROR. Id. at 51.
161. 520 F.2d at 408.
162. 420 U.S. at 123.
163. The court did not continue the quotation to the point where the Supreme Court stated
that in some states, existing procedures might satisfy the fourth amendment, but "[o]thers may
require only minor adjustment." Id. at 124. Presumably the Court thought that federal courts
would determine which systems were not satisfactory and what adjustments were necessary.
164. 520 F.2d at 408.
165. The Supreme Court has consistently demonstrated that it will not hesitate to impose
minimal procedural due process safeguards, even where the state has an important interest to
protect. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (high school students must be provided with
prior notice of charges and the evidence against them, and an opportunity to be heard in their
own defense before they may be suspended for any significant period); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539 (1974) (inmate must be given written notice, an opportunity to be heard and to call
witnesses, as well as a written statement of findings of fact and evidence against him before his
"good time" credits may be revoked); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (indigent
probationers must be given appointed counsel at hearings to determine probation revocation);
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (state may not revoke parole without affording parolee
written notice, opportunity to be heard, opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses and a
written statement of findings of fact); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare termination
requires notice, hearing, cross-examination rights, opportunity to testify and statement of findings).
166. The Court in Gerstein held that "[w]hatever procedure a State may adopt, it must
provide a fair and reliable determination of probable cause as a condition for any significant
pretrial restraint of liberty, and this determination must be made by a judicial officer either
before or promptly after arrest." 420 U.S. at 124-25 (footnote omitted); see note 123 supra.
167. See notes 114-16 supra.
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monitoring the proper level of bail where no arrest or specific discrimination is
alleged, as in O'Shea, would require a vague and conjectural federal court
order. The guidelines in Wallace III, however, are arguably specific enough
68
to permit a state court to follow them.
V. THE FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
Without clear Supreme Court direction defining the scope of the Younger
rationale and delineating the criteria to apply when federal equitable relief is
requested in a matter collateral to a pending state criminal proceeding, the
circuit courts will remain divided. This division will probably continue along
pre-O'Shea lines, since O'Shea and Gerstein did not solve the problem
definitively. Either decision may be criticized as authority on the issue as
being mere dicta. In addition, no set of criteria or tests can be distilled from
an attempt to harmonize the decisions. As a result, the Third, Fourth, Fifth
and Seventh Circuits may continue to favor restricting Younger to injunctions
aimed at halting the state proceeding, while the Second and Ninth Circuits
may continue to extend the Younger rationale to the entire state criminal
process. Unless the Supreme Court addresses the issue and decides in favor of
the Gerstein view, the narrow interpretation of Younger will be more difficult
to defend, since the recent Supreme Court decisions demonstrate a clear trend
169
towards expanding it beyond its original scope.
Wallace III is the only decision to deal with the O'Shea-Gerstein dichotomy
to date. Notwithstanding the Second Circuits predisposition towards
nonintervention,' 70 the decision may be a model of what the prevailing view
will be in the future. The key consideration, as in Wallace III, will be comity
and the traditional equitable requirement of irreparable injury, the two
underlying policy reasons in Younger."'1 Reliance on the expansion of the
2
Younger doctrine in recent Supreme Court decisions will bolster this trend."7
This application of the Younger principle would have its greatest impact on
actions brought under section 1983,1 7 3 the statute most frequently used to
gain access to federal court in the major cases considered in this Note. If a
plaintiff challenged any aspect of the state's criminal system, from arrest
through conviction, he would find his suit barred by Younger considerations. 174 Dismissals based on Younger would leave only a state forum to
decide questions of state deprivation of federal constitutional rights."15 The
168.
169.
text
170.

See note 160 supra.
See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975); notes 18-23 supra and accompanying
See note 92 supra.

171. 520 F.2d at 406.
172. Id. at 404-08; cf. Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 95 S. Ct 2069 (1975).
173. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
174. See, e.g., Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.Zd 375, 382 (2d
Cir. 1973); notes 37, 93-99 & 123 supra and accompanying text.
175. Once state remedies are exhausted, the plaintiff may apply for habeas corpus in federal
court to vindicate the alleged violation of his constitutional rights. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(b), (c) (1970);
see Schneckloth v. Bustarnonte, 412 U.S. 218, 256 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring); Fay v. Noia,
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question then becomes whether this result is contrary
to the intent of Congress
17 6
to provide a federal forum for this purpose.
It is hoped that the Supreme Court will reverse this trend. To this end, the
Court could limit O'Shea to the proposition that vague allegations of discriminating state criminal procedures will be insufficient to invoke federal
relief, and that the federal court, wherever possible, should provide minimal
standards and guidelines for equitable relief.
Kenneth F. Khoury
372 U.S. 391, 437-39 (1963); Note, Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 Harv.
L. Rev. 1038, 1093-94 (1970).
176. Hicks v. Miranda, 95 S. Ct. 2281, 2295 (1975) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Prelser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 477 (1973); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 239 (1972); McNeese v.
Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 671 (1963); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961); see note 42
supra and accompanying text.

